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ENSURING JUSTICE WITHOUT “BEATING THE DEAL” 
Sean Patrick Flynn* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1950 military justice changed drastically with the enactment of the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
1
  The UCMJ brought many protections to service 
members that were standard in civilian criminal practice, but there still existed 
differences between the two systems.
2
  Recent changes to the UCMJ eliminated 
more of those differences.  The Joint Service Committee recommended further 
changes, which were accepted,
3
 to the way the military handles guilty pleas and plea 
agreements in the Rules for Courts-Martial (RCM), which govern the procedure and 
substance of courts-martial.
4
  The primary change discussed here is the removal of 
the military’s “beat the deal” provision.  Previously, the accused and the convening 
authority
5
 agreed to a guilty plea and the maximum sentence to be permitted by the 
convening authority.
6
  The accused then chose whether he wanted to be sentenced 
by a panel (the military equivalent of a jury) or a military judge, and “[i]f the 
sentencing authority impose[d] a less severe sentence than agreed upon [with the 
convening authority], the accused [received] the lesser sentence.  The sentence 
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 1 See Truman Signs Code of Service Justice: Bill Provides a Civilian Court of Military 
Appeals and Safeguards Defendants, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 1950), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1950/05/07/archives/truman-signs-code-of-service-justice-bill-provides-
a-civilian-court.html.  Prior to the UCMJ, military justice was governed by the Articles of War, 
established in 1775 and modified several times in the subsequent centuries.  Mynda G. Ohman, 
Integrating Title 18 War Crimes into Title 10: A Proposal to Amend the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice, 57 A.F. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2005). 
 2 See infra Parts I and III. 
 3 See 2018 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, Exec. Order No. 
13,825, 83 Fed. Reg. 9889, annex 2 at 9907 (Mar. 1, 2018). 
 4 See infra Part I. 
 5 In the military, a convening authority is someone vested with power to convene courts-
martial and impose punishment, subject to legal restrictions.  See Ernesto Gapasin, What Is a 
Convening Authority?, MILITARYLAWYER-DEFENSE.COM (Nov. 23, 2015), 
http://www.militarylawyer-defense.com/what-is-a-convening-authority/.  
 6 See Francis A. Gilligan, The Bill of Rights and Service Members, 1987 ARMY LAW. 3, 9.   
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[could] never exceed that agreed upon.”7  The sentencing authority was also unaware 
of the terms for which the accused bargained.
8
  The removal of this provision will 
allow military plea agreements (previously called pretrial agreements) to more 
closely emulate the civilian system of plea bargaining.  However, the civilian system 
is not without its flaws.  To avoid some of the civilian system’s pitfalls, military 
justice will need to rely on the gumption of military judges to reject plea agreements 
that are unjust, in the same way it relies on military judges to reject guilty pleas that 
are improvident.
9
 
The major flaw in the civilian plea bargaining system is its inherent coercion.  
Two of the manifestations of that coercion are that innocent people may plead guilty 
and that guilty people may accept unjust sentences.  The military justice system 
already has an effective process in place to prevent innocent people from pleading 
guilty.
10
  However, the changes to the RCM highlight the importance of preventing 
the guilty accused from being coerced into accepting unjust plea agreements.   
Part I of this Essay begins with a brief history of plea bargaining in the military, 
and discusses the process the military used to dispose of guilty pleas and pretrial 
agreements, and then highlights some of the changes.  Part II analyzes the civilian 
method of plea bargaining and delves into the two coercive manifestations of the 
system.  Part III presents how the military avoided the first pitfall of coercive plea 
agreements and recommends how the military can ensure that changes to its system 
do not result in unjust sentences.  This Essay concludes that while the removal of 
military judges’ independent sentencing ability in concert with a pretrial agreement 
reduces their authority, it actually increases military judges’ responsibility, as they 
must be actively willing to reject unjust plea agreements. 
I.     MILITARY PLEA BARGAINING 
Plea bargaining began in the military shortly after Congress passed the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, and arguably because of it.
11
  Recognizing the 
efficiency value of disposing of cases in this way, “[i]n 1953, the Army became the 
first service to officially encourage plea-bargaining.”12  Of note, this was nearly two 
 
 7 Id.; see also MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 705(b)(2)(E) 
(2016) [hereinafter MCM].  
 8 Francis A. Gilligan & Michael D. Wims, Civilian Justice v. Military Justice: In Many 
Instances, Service Members Accused of Crime Are Granted More Rights than Civilians, 5 CRIM. 
JUST. 2, 37 (1990); see also MCM, supra note 7, R.C.M. 910(f)(3) (stating that in the case of 
sentencing by a military judge the “military judge alone . . . shall not examine any sentence 
limitation contained in the agreement until after the sentence of the court-martial has been 
announced”). 
 9 Cf. Randy V. Cargill, The Article 63 Windfall, 1989 ARMY LAW. 26, 26 (discussing the 
role of the military judge in resolving inconsistencies at the trial level and the ability of 
inconsistencies to indicate an improvident guilty plea). 
 10 See infra Part III. 
 11 See Carlton L. Jackson, Plea-Bargaining in the Military: An Unintended Consequence of 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 179 MIL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2004). 
 12 Id. at 4.  In a letter to all Staff Judge Advocates, the Judge Advocate General wrote:  
[O]ver 94.4 per cent, [of convictions in federal court] were based on pleas of guilty or 
nolo contendre [sic]. . . .  [In general courts-martial] the indication is that in only about 
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decades before the Supreme Court lauded the value of bargaining for guilty pleas.
13
  
Nonetheless, the Army quickly recognized some of the flaws inherent in the newly 
encouraged procedure.  Most relevant “was a practice by some staff judge advocates 
that required the accused ‘to forego his right to present to the court matters in 
extenuation or mitigation of the offense charged’ in the pretrial agreement.”14  The 
government correctly realized that if the accused could present this evidence, the 
defense would have the opportunity to “beat the deal in court.”15  In response to this 
practice by the government, the Judge Advocate General
16
 published that “[w]aiving 
extenuation and mitigation evidence in pretrial agreements was prohibited.”17   
“Beating the deal” was a staple of military justice.  It allowed the sentencing 
authority to sentence the accused to whatever it believed was just, but did not leave 
the accused solely at the mercy of the sentencing authority’s discretion.  Because the 
accused agreed to a sentence cap, he maintained the benefit of his bargain.  Further, 
the likelihood of the accused facing an unjust sentence was reduced because of an 
independent sentence by the sentencing authority. 
Sentences imposed through pretrial agreements and lesser imposed sentences 
established by the sentencing authority were subject to appeal.  Often military judges 
used the phrase “beat the deal” in their opinions when they described the practice.18  
The words themselves indicated a possible perception of it, in that the accused may 
end up in a better position than what was bargained for. 
Commentators left no doubt about the potential shortcomings of the practice.  
Article 63 of the UCMJ, which remained unchanged, states that if an accused’s case 
 
one per cent of the cases were the findings based wholly on the pleas.  Why this great 
disparity between the two systems in the numbers of sentences based on contest?   
Id. app. A at 46–47. 
 13 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (“The disposition of criminal charges 
by agreement between the prosecutor and the accused, sometimes loosely called ‘plea bargaining,’ 
is an essential component of the administration of justice.  Properly administered, it is to be 
encouraged.”). 
 14 Jackson, supra note 11, at 25 (citation omitted). 
 15 Id. at 25–26. 
 16 The Judge Advocate General is the highest-ranking lawyer in each branch of the military.  
Cf. Gilligan & Wims, supra note 8, at 36 (discussing the Judge Advocate General’s ability to 
appoint military judges, who are subordinate to the Judge Advocate General position in each of the 
branches of the service).  
 17 Jackson, supra note 11, at 26 (citation omitted); see also Robinson O. Everett, The 50th 
Anniversary of the Uniform Code: A Historical Look at Military Justice, 16 CRIM. JUST. 21, 24 
(2001) (“In the 1960s, the U.S. Army . . . allowed a defendant to enter into a written pretrial 
agreement in which, in return for the accused’s guilty plea, the convening authority would 
disapprove any portion of the defendant’s sentence that exceeded the agreed amount.  The accused 
remained free to ‘beat the deal’ by seeking from the court-martial a sentence below the maximum 
set by the pretrial agreement.”). 
 18 United States v. Difusco, No. 96 01550, 1999 WL 147599, at *4 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 
Feb. 26, 1999) (“He beat his deal significantly when he only received 30 days confinement . . . .”); 
United States v. Wooden, No. S29154, 1996 WL 649234, at *1 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 30, 1996) 
(“She beat the deal at trial . . . .”); United States v. Morales, 12 M.J. 888, 890 (A.C.M.R. 1982) 
(“[A]n accused [must] be given the tactical option of attempting to ‘beat the deal’ . . . .”). 
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is reheard, his sentence may not be increased from the initial hearing.
19
  “The effect 
of these provisions is to make an appeal by the accused virtually risk-free.”20  
Regardless of what happens during the appeal, the accused’s sentence will not be 
increased, and if it is remanded for resentencing there is a chance that it will be 
reduced.
21
  Furthermore, in resentencing, the panel (if the accused so elects) is 
directed that the maximum punishment remains that which was previously adjudged, 
but are not told the statutory basis for why.
22
  This means “the accused has a 
justifiable hope that [the sentence] will be decreased.”23  Therefore, the accused has 
every incentive to search for a way to invalidate his pretrial agreement, most often 
by arguing his guilty plea was improvident.
24
  Frustration with the current workings 
led to tense words by practitioners
25
 and judges.
26
  Article 63 affected, and still 
affects, all sentences regardless of how imposed.  However, there was something 
particularly striking about an accused bargaining for a deal, receiving a better 
outcome at sentencing, and then attacking it again. 
Additionally, the government was forced to make an intense effort to ensure 
that the deal it bargained for was ultimately adjudged.  To counter the effect of 
mitigating evidence presented by the defense at sentencing, “the trial counsel [the 
military lawyer acting as prosecutor] w[ould] often attempt to include such 
uncharged misconduct in a stipulation of fact to ensure that the defense does not 
‘beat the deal.’”27  While the sentencing authority is constitutionally permitted to 
consider facts not proved at trial,
28
 the Court of Military Appeals (CMA)
29
 held in 
 
 19 UCMJ art. 63, 10 U.S.C. § 863 (2012) (“Upon a rehearing . . . no sentence in excess of or 
more severe than the original sentence may be approved . . . .”); see also MCM, supra note 7, 
R.C.M. 810(d). 
 20 See Cargill, supra note 9, at 27. 
 21 Id. 
 22 See id.  
 23 Id. 
 24 See id. at 26. 
 25 See id. at 27 n.8 (“I believe it is manifestly unfair that an accused should profit from his 
breach of the pretrial agreement.”); John F. O’Connor, Foolish Consistencies and the Appellate 
Review of Courts-Martial, 41 AKRON L. REV. 175, 220 (2008) (“[D]o we really want to have a 
military justice system that allows an accused to urge a military judge to accept a pretrial agreement 
a trial and then get up on appeal and have his new appellate defense counsel argue that the very 
terms that the accused negotiated, accepted, and urged the military judge to accept should be thrown 
out?”). 
 26 United States v. Epps, 20 M.J. 534, 537 (A.C.M.R. 1985) (Suter, C.J., dissenting).  
Dissenting from a decision to set aside a finding of guilty due to an improvident guilty plea, Judge 
Suter stated, “[t]he majority has gone to great lengths to find error in this case.  Indeed, this case 
represents the epitome of legal hair splitting.  It is this type of judicial frolicking that erodes 
confidence in criminal law, military or civilian.”  Id. 
 27 Mary M. Foreman, Let’s Make a Deal! The Development of Pretrial Agreements in 
Military Criminal Justice Practice, 170 MIL. L. REV. 53, 96 (2001). 
 28 United States v. Fitch, 659 F.3d 788, 790 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that the district court 
judge was permitted to consider evidence that the accused murdered his wife to further his fraud, 
even though he was only convicted for fraud). 
 29 C.M.A. is the precursor to the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (C.A.A.F.).  See 
Military Courts, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/military-courts (last visited 
Jan. 1, 2019). 
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United States v. Glazier
30
 that unless the admissibility of facts was explicit in the 
stipulation itself, the “admissibility of any fact so stipulated is governed by the 
Military Rules of Evidence.”31  This allowed the accused the possibility of 
stipulating to facts beneficial to the government but later challenging them on 
evidentiary grounds.  The accused would merely need to not stipulate to the 
admissibility of the facts.  A concurring opinion even suggested this could be done 
without violating a pretrial agreement.
32
 
Despite criticism, the accused’s ability to “beat the deal” remained part of 
military justice since its restructuring in the 1950s.  However, in response to recent 
changes to the UCMJ
33
 and in furtherance of its mission, the Joint Service 
Committee issued proposed amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) 
in July 2017.
34
  These amendments were approved in March 2018.
35
  Among other 
major changes, the amendments eliminated “the ‘beat the deal’ concept under which 
the accused received the lesser of the adjudged sentence or the sentence cap 
negotiated with the convening authority.”36  The changes resulted in a substantial 
revision of RCM 705 (the rule governing pretrial agreements, which are now 
referred to as plea agreements)
37
 and RCM 910 (the rule governing pleas by an 
accused),
38
 especially in regards to the military judge’s responsibility.  The new rule 
dictates that if the military judge rejects a plea agreement he must “inform the 
accused that if the plea is not withdrawn the court-martial may impose any lawful 
 
 30 26 M.J. 268 (C.M.A. 1988). 
 31 Id. at 270. 
 32 Id. at 271 (Everett, C.J., concurring) (“Moreover, making such an objection successfully 
does not violate a pretrial agreement requiring the accused to enter into a particular stipulation of 
fact and does not entitle the Government to abrogate the pretrial agreement.”); see also Foreman, 
supra note 27, at 98 (“Thus, it is the government’s burden to include in the stipulation of fact a 
provision regarding admissibility of the matters contained therein . . . .”). 
 33 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, 130 
Stat. 2000 (2016) (to be codified in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.). 
 34 See Proposed Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2016 ed.), 82 
Fed. Reg. 31,952 (July 11, 2017). 
 35 See 2018 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, Exec. Order No. 
13,825, 83 Fed. Reg. 9889 (Mar. 1, 2018). 
 36 Executive Summary of Proposed Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, JOINT 
SERV. COMM., https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/Documents/ExecutiveSummary.pdf?ver=2017-
07-19-103048-967 (last visited Jan. 1, 2019). 
 37 The changes include changing the name of the rule from pretrial agreements to plea 
agreements, itself indicating the new focus on the outcome.  Compare MCM, supra note 7, R.C.M. 
705, with Proposed Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2016 ed.), 82 
Fed. Reg. 31, 952, annex 2 at 113 (July 11, 2017), and 2018 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-
Martial, United States, Exec. Order No. 13,825, 83 Fed. Reg. 9889, annex 2 at 9965 (Mar. 1, 2018). 
 38 Compare MCM, supra note 7, R.C.M. 910, with Proposed Amendments to the Manual for 
Courts-Martial, United States (2016 ed.), 82 Fed. Reg. 31,952, annex 2 at 161 (July 11, 2017), and 
2018 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, Exec. Order No. 13,825, 83 
Fed. Reg. 9889, annex 2 at 9990 (Mar. 1, 2018). 
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punishment.”39  This change brought the military sentencing process significantly 
more in line with the civilian system and became effective January 1, 2019.
40
 
The role of the sentencing authority, and especially the military judge, will 
dramatically change.  He, or the panel, will no longer independently create a 
sentence for every accused.  While this may decrease the military judge’s authority 
in plea agreements, it increases his responsibility.  The judge will see in advance 
what the convening authority believes is a fair sentence or sentence range, and the 
accused can only rely on the military judge to reject an unjust plea agreement.  To 
highlight the importance of this judicial protection, the next Part highlights some 
pitfalls of the civilian system. 
II.     CIVILIAN PLEA BARGAINING 
In the words of the Supreme Court, “plea bargaining . . . is the criminal justice 
system.”41  And while the system’s flaws may be extensive and well documented, it 
is worth further discussing some of the relevant features that may now become 
pertinent to military sentencing.  One of the greatest concerns about civilian plea 
bargaining is its inherent coercion.
42
  While the Supreme Court rejected that the 
process is coercive in the legal sense,
43
 in a practical sense its coercive aspects are 
irrefutable.
44
  Relevant here are two manifestations of coercion: the coercion that 
induces an accused to plead guilty and the coercion that induces the guilty accused 
to accept an unjust sentence. 
Early American and most common-law justice actually dissuaded guilty 
pleas,
45
 not to mention plea bargains.  By the 1920s “[t]he dominance of the guilty 
plea apparently came as a remarkable surprise to contemporary observers.”46  While 
for many years the Supreme Court declined to rule on the legality of plea 
bargaining,
47
 it ultimately gave it positive reviews in Santobello v. New York.
48
  The 
Court recognized that while there were some safeguards to protect the accused, there 
were inherent issues with plea bargaining.  For example, earlier, in United States v. 
 
 39 2018 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, Exec. Order No. 
13,825, 83 Fed. Reg. 9889, annex 2 at 9992 (Mar. 1, 2018). 
 40 Id. at 9890. 
 41 Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012) (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, 
Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)). 
 42 See generally Candace McCoy, Plea Bargaining as Coercion: The Trial Penalty and Plea 
Bargaining Reform, 50 CRIM. L.Q. 67 (2005) (describing some of the coercive aspects of plea 
bargaining). 
 43 See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971). 
 44 See, e.g., McCoy, supra note 42, at 95–96. 
 45 Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1979). 
 46 Id. at 26. 
 47 Id. at 37 (“[T]he Supreme Court had . . . opportunities to consider the legality of plea 
negotiation but did not use them.”); id. at 37 n.208; see also Carlino v. United States, 394 U.S. 
1013 (1969); Cooper v. Holman, 385 U.S. 855 (1966); Bailey v. MacDougall, 384 U.S. 962 (1966); 
Darrah v. Illinois, 383 U.S. 919 (1966); Pinedo v. United States, 382 U.S. 976 (1966); Green v. 
Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 905 (1958); Shelton v. United States, 356 U.S. 26 (1958). 
 48 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971). 
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Jackson,
49
 the Court stated that “[i]t is established that due process forbids 
convicting a defendant on the basis of a coerced guilty plea.”50  The Court in Jackson 
held that a statute that removed the possibility of death for defendants who forwent 
their right to a jury trial, but mandated it if the jury recommended death, “[could not] 
be justified by its ostensible purpose . . . [and] Congress cannot impose such a 
penalty in a manner that needlessly penalizes the assertion of a constitutional 
right.”51  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court continued to authorize and encourage plea 
bargaining. 
While recognizing that coercion could not be permitted, the Supreme Court set 
a high bar for coercion to be legally recognized.  In the landmark case Brady v. 
United States
52
 the Court confronted head-on the possibility of coercion due to the 
threat of an extreme sentence.  There, the Court held that “a plea of guilty is not 
invalid merely because entered to avoid the possibility of a death penalty.”53  Rather, 
impermissibly coerced pleas are those produced by “actual or threatened physical 
harm or by mental coercion overbearing the will of the defendant.”54  It determined 
there was no “evidence that Brady was so gripped by fear of the death penalty . . . 
that he did not or could not” act rationally.55  By holding that the threat of death was 
not per se coercion and did not overbear the will of the defendant, the Supreme Court 
made clear there was little that would qualify as coercion. 
Regardless of how the Supreme Court defines unlawful coercion, many 
commentators staunchly believe that the system is coercive.  Professor John 
Langbein has even gone so far as to analogize plea bargaining to torture.
56
  He 
believes that while we may not use archaic devices like the rack, thumbscrew or 
Spanish boot, “we make it terribly costly for an accused to claim his right to the 
constitutional safeguard of trial,”57 and any difference between the two is one of 
degree.
58
  In a similar vein, Professor Donald Dripps argues that “extreme trial 
penalties are not just analogous to coerced confessions, . . . they are constitutionally 
 
 49 390 U.S. 570 (1968). 
 50 Id. at 581 n.20 (citing Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116, 118 (1956)). 
 51 Id. at 582–83. 
 52 397 U.S. 742 (1970). 
 53 Id. at 755. 
 54 Id. at 750. 
 55 Id. 
 56 John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 3 (1978). 
 57 Id. at 12. 
 58 Id. at 13 (“Plea bargaining, like torture, is coercive.”). 
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indistinguishable.”59  Others suggest “that plea bargaining is not just coercive under 
abnormally stressful conditions, but that coercion is the norm.”60 
A seminal Supreme Court case demonstrated how that coercion may come 
about in practice.  In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, Paul Lewis Hayes was indicted for 
forging a check for $88.30, a crime punishable by a term between two and ten years 
in prison.
61
  The prosecutor offered to recommend five years in prison.
62
  However, 
if Hayes refused the offer, the prosecutor threatened to return to the grand jury and 
indict Hayes under a habitual offender statute, which carried a mandatory sentence 
of life in prison.
63
  Hayes inexplicably refused, was reindicted, found guilty of 
forging the check and violating the habitual offender statute, and sentenced to life in 
prison.
64
  He appealed.
65
  The Supreme Court held that “Hayes was properly 
chargeable under the recidivist statute” and “so long as the prosecutor has probable 
cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the 
decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand 
jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.”66  The Supreme Court allowed a 
prosecutor to threaten a defendant with a severe sentence, life in prison, for a 
nonviolent crime.  Further, it intimated there was little practical limit on the 
bargaining tactics prosecutors could employ to obtain a guilty plea.
67
  Prosecutors 
responded, and there are several innovative techniques to pressure defendants to 
accept a plea bargain.
68
 
The first possible victim of the coercive system is an innocent accused, who 
will feel the same pressures to plea bargain as guilty individuals.  The fear of 
innocent people being convicted through guilty pleas has been realized and “we now 
know that innocent people plead guilty in the United States.”69  Although seemingly 
irrational, innocent people may think the state’s evidence—even if false—will be 
 
 59 Donald A. Dripps, Guilt, Innocence, and Due Process of Plea Bargaining, 57 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1343, 1364 (2016); see also id. at 1343–46 (including a thought experiment where 
individuals are forced to choose between seventy-two hours of enhanced interrogation or forty 
years at a typical American penitentiary; and noting that while most individuals would prefer the 
torture, most courts would not accept the pleas induced by fear of torture, but would accept those 
induced by fear of extended prison terms); Brandi Buchman, Trump Judicial Nominees Get Tough 
Going Over from Hawaii’s Hirono, COURTHOUSE NEWS (Oct. 4, 2017), 
https://www.courthousenews.com/senate-democrats-grill-trump-judicial-nominees/ (discussing a 
nonpublished paper Stephanos Bibas wrote where he advocated for defendants to be given some 
nondisfiguring corporeal punishment, as opposed to prison sentences). 
 60 ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 122 (1987) (emphasis omitted). 
 61 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358 (1978). 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 358–59. 
 64 Id. at 359. 
 65 Id. at 360. 
 66 Id. at 364. 
 67 Id. at 365.  
 68 See Cynthia Alkon, Hard Bargaining in Plea Bargaining: When Do Prosecutors Cross 
the Line?, 17 NEV. L.J. 401, 407 (2017) (noting that prosecutors will use exploding offers, threats 
to add enhancements, threats to add additional charges, take-it-or-leave-it offers, and threats to seek 
the death penalty to acquire a guilty plea). 
 69 Id. at 414 (“For example, 17 percent of those exonerated in 2013 first pled guilty to the 
charges.”). 
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compelling to a neutral party, the offer from the prosecutor “is too good to refuse,” 
and/or they are not convinced they will “receive a fair and unbiased hearing.”70  
Those defendants with criminal records “will accept another mark on their record[s] 
as the price to pay for avoiding the process costs of trials or the significantly worse 
sentences they might receive if they exercised their right to trial and were 
convicted.”71  Ideally we would never punish those innocent of a crime,72 but that 
ideal is not the reality. 
There is also the coercive effect on guilty defendants who intend to plead 
guilty.  They are susceptible to similar pressures, and in their case it may lead them 
to “fail to litigate issues, such as search and seizure motions” that could potentially 
spare them a conviction.
73
  And even if the hope of a dismissal or other 
nonconviction is far-fetched, defendants should be able to expect a just sentence.  
However, pressure from the prosecutor may convince defendants to “accept[] bad 
deals as they try to avoid potentially much higher sentences after trial.”74  
Furthermore, “[d]efendants may get higher sentences depending on who the 
prosecutor is and what the particular prosecutor offers” and therefore “defendants 
often find they have no option but to take the bad deal, because the sentence after 
conviction at trial would be worse.”75 
While defendants in this situation may, at a glance, appear less sympathetic 
than the innocent, their treatment by the system has important implications.  Treating 
similarly situated defendants the same contributes to trust in the system and process.  
But nonetheless, “[a]mong states and even within a single state, the prevalence of 
process discounts is extraordinarily varied, as are the causes and methods of 
discounting.”76  The coercion that some defendants face, which results in varied 
sentences, is not beneficial to the perception of our justice system, or fair to those it 
 
 70 Russell D. Covey, Plea-Bargaining Law After Lafler and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 595, 616–
17 (2013).  But see Oren Gazal-Ayal & Avishalom Tor, The Innocence Effect, 62 DUKE L.J. 339, 
339 (2012) (“[I]nnocents are significantly less likely to accept plea offers that appear attractive to 
similarly situated guilty defendants.”). 
 71 Richard L. Lippke, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Constitution, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 
709, 722 (2013). 
 72 One scholar interestingly posits that “innocent defendants are better off in a world with 
plea bargaining than one without it.”  Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
1117, 1117–18 (2008) (arguing that the system should make simpler the process of pleading guilty 
for innocent defendants because “many recidivist innocent defendants are punished by process and 
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 73 Alkon, supra note 68, at 404.  While the failure of individual defendants to litigate these 
issues may not make a difference to them, it has serious policy implications such as allowing 
“prosecutors and judges [to] uncover larger problems, such as police officers who are acting 
abusively and illegally.”  Id. at 415. 
 74 Id. at 404. 
 75 Id. at 415.  This line of thinking by defendants is justified as sentences given at trial can 
be up to four times higher than a defendant who took a plea deal.  Cynthia Alkon, The U.S. Supreme 
Court’s Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining: The Impact of Lafler and Frye, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
561, 603–04 (2014). 
 76 Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in Sentences After 
Guilty Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 959 
(2005). 
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affects.  Furthermore, even consistent but overly harsh sentences serve no one, and 
are only a drain on the people and institutions involved. 
While held legal, the coercive pressure to plead guilty is very real for those 
charged with a crime.  Regardless of whether it manifests as pressure for an innocent 
defendant to plead guilty, or pressure for a guilty defendant to take a plea that is not 
necessarily just, the coercion a defendant feels impacts her choice. 
III.     THE NEW ROLE OF THE MILITARY JUDGE, INSPIRED BY THE OLD 
This Part will discuss how the concerns of the civilian system transfer over to 
the military system, especially considering recent changes to military justice.  
Removing the accused’s ability to “beat the deal” and disincentivizing the military 
judge’s ability to independently sentence brought military justice more in line with 
the civilian system.
77
  As discussed above, that system is not perfect.  The military 
already has a unique process in place to prevent innocent accused from pleading 
guilty, discussed below.  Now, it must more directly confront the possibility of the 
guilty accused receiving unjust sentences. 
Interestingly, the removal of the “beat the deal” provision, likely never 
coercive standing alone, may actually take away some incentive for an accused to 
plead guilty.  While it may not have been rational to hope for a military judge or 
panel to adjudge a more lenient sentence, the accused knew the sentence could not 
be harsher.  The safe harbor and the possibility of a reduction may have been just 
enough incentive to get some accused to sign on to a plea.
78
  This change puts 
military accused in substantially the same position as their civilian counterparts: 
what they agree to is what they will probably get.
79
 
In the military system, the responsibility to prevent innocent accused from 
pleading guilty rests with the military judge.  Although all guilty pleas must establish 
some sort of factual basis for the crime, in the civilian system the rigor that goes into 
the plea colloquy, and the practical consequence of the plea colloquy, varies.
80
  In 
the military system, there is no such inconsistency.  Before accepting a plea bargain, 
military judges inform the accused of many of the same rights civilian judges do.
81
  
 
 77 Although civilian judges are not bound by plea agreements, the overwhelming perception 
is that they rarely reject them based on a disagreement with the sentence.  See generally Albert W. 
Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059 (1976). 
 78 For an interesting analysis of “plea bargaining through the lens of game theory,” see H. 
Mitchell Caldwell, Coercive Plea Bargaining: The Unrecognized Scourge of the Justice System, 
61 CATH. U. L. REV. 63, 67–75 (2011). 
 79 This assumes judicial acceptance of the plea.  See supra note 77. 
 80 See William T. Stone, Jr., Note, Waiving Good-Bye to Inconsistency: Factual Basis 
Challenges to Guilty Pleas in Federal Courts, 45 GA. L. REV. 311, 315–24 (2010) (noting the 
requirement of a factual basis in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, but highlighting a circuit 
split on whether an inadequate factual basis may serve as a basis for appeal). 
 81 See MCM, supra note 7, R.C.M. 910(c) (informing the accused of the nature of the offense, 
mandatory minimums and maximums, the right to counsel, to plead not guilty, a trial by court-
martial, and the possibility of perjury in his answers during the providence inquiry). 
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Then, they ensure the plea is voluntary
82
 and determine the accuracy of the plea.
83
  
Although also required in federal civilian courts, the Court of Military Appeals made 
clear in United States v. Care
84
 that much more is expected of military judges.  It is 
not enough in the military to make a cursory statement of guilt for the requisite 
elements of a crime.
85
  The obvious purpose of this is to ensure that service members 
who plead guilty are in fact guilty. 
Since Care, the military made clear it takes the precedent laid down very 
seriously.  Not only does Care have over 1500 citing references from cases alone,
86
 
but the specific treatment it continues to receive demonstrates its authority.  In 
United States v. Jordan,
87
 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 
(“CAAF”) held that “[i]t is not enough to elicit legal conclusions.  The military judge 
must elicit facts to support the plea of guilty.”88  Later in United States v. Blouin,89 
CAAF determined that an inconsistency in explaining offenses to the accused, as 
well as the failure of the judge to make further inquiries once he determined that 
several of the pieces of evidence did not qualify as child pornography, created “a 
substantial basis in law and fact to question the providence of the guilty plea.”90  The 
importance of the providence inquiry has stood nearly half a century and arguably 
gained strength over time.  It affects how, and ultimately if, an accused is able to 
plead guilty.  But while the providence inquiry is meant to ensure an accused is 
guilty of exactly what he is charged with, it does not by itself prevent all coercive 
plea agreements. 
Similar to RCM 910(e)’s purpose in ensuring accuracy, 910(d) is meant to 
ensure voluntariness.
91
  However, 910(d) has received significantly less attention.
92
  
This may be because the rule is relatively straightforward.  It, in substantial part, 
 
 82 Id. R.C.M. 910(d). 
 83 Id. R.C.M. 910(e) (“The military judge shall not accept a plea of guilty without making 
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plea.”). 
 84 40 C.M.R. 247 (1969). 
 85 Id. at 253 (“This requirement will not be satisfied by questions such as whether the accused 
realizes that a guilty plea admits ‘every element charged and every act or omission alleged and 
authorizes conviction of the offense without further proof.’”). 
 86 Westlaw search conducted on November 16, 2018.  Further, all but two of these citations 
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criminal appeals, for which it is binding precedent. 
 87 57 M.J. 236 (C.A.A.F. 2002). 
 88 Id. at 238. 
 89 74 M.J. 247 (C.A.A.F. 2015). 
 90 Id. at 252. 
 91 MCM, supra note 7, R.C.M. 910(d) (“The military judge shall not accept a plea of guilty 
without first, by addressing the accused personally, determining that the plea is voluntary and not 
the result of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement under R.C.M. 705.”). 
 92 Only thirty-eight military court decisions cite R.C.M. 910(d) as opposed to over 450 
military court decisions citing R.C.M. 910(e), in addition to the numerous citing references for 
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mirrors the standard set out in Brady.
93
  However, as previously discussed, this broad 
standard does not, and will not, prevent all coercion from affecting plea bargaining.   
Previously, the practical impacts of Rule 910(d) may have been less 
significant.  If an accused agreed to an unjust sentence—especially one that was 
patently unjust, but even one that was unjust at the margins—there was an 
independent check on it by the military judge or panel.  The sentencing authority’s 
ability to make a sentence based wholly on the stipulated facts and those presented 
during extenuation and mitigation arguments was an additional security for the 
justness of the imposed sentence.  The decision would not be influenced by 
knowledge of an already agreed upon sentence.  And, if all things considered, the 
sentencing authority thought the accused deserved more punishment, the accused 
made a good deal.  The ability to “beat the deal” was an additional check on severity 
which arguably minimized the importance of a just agreement with the convening 
authority.  However, that additional check no longer exists.
94
 
Moving forward, the only way for military judges to ensure an accused 
receives a just sentence is to hold a plea agreement to the fire.  The judges’ 
evaluations of just sentences will no longer be done in a vacuum, but rather will have 
to be applied to the agreement they are evaluating.  It may be ironic, but as military 
judges’ authority is in a sense decreased, their responsibility actually increases.  This 
responsibility is to zealously reject unjust plea agreements.  For the first time, they 
will be responsible for scrutinizing the plea agreement for a just sentence or sentence 
range, something very different from creating a sentence from scratch.  By rejecting 
plea agreements for unjust terms, and explaining their reasoning as required by the 
rules,
95
 military judges will be telling convening authorities what sentences are 
appropriate.  While this will occur in a much more roundabout way than the 
sentencing authority merely doing what they believe is just, it will accomplish the 
necessary purpose of preventing unjust plea agreements from being approved. 
But how will military judges know what a just sentence truly is?  The new 
system may lead to less evidence being presented in extenuation or mitigation.  Trial 
and defense counsel may believe they have already reached a fair deal.  The burden 
again falls on military judges.  They may have to inquire independently.  Following 
a providence inquiry, the military judge should ask if there were any circumstances 
outside of the factual basis uncovered during the providence inquiry that went into 
the formulation of the plea agreement.  While there may be incrimination or other 
concerns military judges must navigate, a complete picture is needed when 
determining if a sentence is just. 
Military judges are up to the task of ensuring convening authorities and trial 
counsel are not unjust in their sentences or sentence ranges.  However, hurdles and 
perverse incentives remain.  When a military judge decides to reject a plea 
agreement, one of two things will happen.  Either the accused will withdraw his plea, 
 
 93 Compare Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970) (defining coercion as “actual 
or threatened physical harm or by mental coercion overbearing the will of the defendant”), with 
MCM, supra note 7, R.C.M. 910(e). 
 94 See 2018 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, Exec. Order No. 
13,825, 83 Fed. Reg. 9889 (Mar. 1, 2018). 
 95 Id. annex 2 at 9992. 
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or the accused will plead straight up and the court-martial “may impose any lawful 
punishment.”96  If the military judge makes clear that he is rejecting the plea because 
the sentence is too harsh, or some similar reason, it is possible the accused will plead 
straight up, or at the very least the accused will gain leverage with the convening 
authority and attempt to renegotiate.  Either way, the process is significantly 
extended, resulting in either sentencing arguments, or a new plea agreement being 
presented to the judge.  If the military judge rejects the agreement because the 
sentence is not harsh enough, or some other reason not clearly favoring the accused, 
then the accused is very unlikely to plead straight up, and may be motivated to seek 
a trial.  Furthermore, in this situation the accused may justifiably believe it would be 
unfair to have the same judge sitting at his contested trial and might request a recusal.  
Military judges, in all circumstances, will save themselves a lot of trouble by simply 
accepting the plea agreement presented. 
At this point, the motivations and external pressures military judges will face 
in dealing with cases begin to look very similar to those faced by civilian judges.  A 
full docket and a responsibility to resolve cases is no small concern.  The increased 
incentives to accept plea agreements highlights the importance of judges truly 
believing the agreements they approve are just, even at the margins. 
CONCLUSION 
The aforementioned changes to the Rules for Courts-Martial are just one aspect 
of many changes to military justice, courtesy of the Military Justice Act of 2016.
97
  
The Act brought military justice more in line with the civilian system.  The ultimate 
removal of the “beat the deal” provision by the Joint Service Committee brought it 
even closer.  However, as discussed above, the civilian system is not without its 
flaws.  The military created, and uses effectively, a process to ensure the providence 
of guilty pleas.  That process relies extensively on a military judge.  Military justice 
must again call upon the military judge to exercise more responsibility in ensuring 
all plea agreements are not only truthful, but also just.  The removal of the ability to 
“beat the deal” will not benefit the accused.  However, that does not necessarily 
mean that military sentences will become more unjust.  It does necessarily mean that 
military judges are responsible for ensuring they do not. 
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